African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) is invoked as an example of the political selectivity that Noam Chomsky argues shapes official uses of the term “terrorism.” In his account, Washington designated the ANC a terrorist organization, yet did not place apartheid South Africa in the same category as Cuba and other states labeled “terrorist nations.” This contrast illustrates how a classification applied to a non-state movement could coexist with the exclusion of a powerful state from the same designation.

Political Classification

Chomsky situates the ANC within a dispute over the meaning of terrorism and the rights of peoples resisting domination. A 1987 United Nations General Assembly resolution condemned international terrorism while affirming that its language did not prejudice the rights of peoples deprived by force of self-determination, freedom, and independence. It also preserved their right to struggle for those rights and seek support, subject to the United Nations Charter and other principles of international law. Chomsky says the United States and Israel did not accept those rights in the terms set out in the resolution; he adds that their ally South Africa had likewise not accepted them at an earlier time.

Against that background, the ANC’s designation by Washington becomes part of a broader contrast in political treatment. Chomsky states that the United States treated the African National Congress as a terrorist organization, while South Africa was not placed alongside Cuba and other countries in the category of “terrorist nations.” The distinction, in his analysis, shows how the label could attach to an opponent without being applied comparably to a state aligned with Washington.

Terrorism and State Power

Chomsky argues that official definitions of terrorism can describe actions by states as well as those of non-state groups. He compares the United States’ stated doctrine of “low-intensity warfare” with the official U.S. definition of terrorism, which he summarizes as coercive means directed against civilian populations to achieve political, religious, or other aims. In his framing, the similarity between the terms exposes a tension: conduct can fit a formal definition of terrorism while being described in state doctrine under another name.

He also distinguishes a literal definition from a propagandistic usage in which “terrorism” refers to violence by enemies against the United States or its allies. The ANC example belongs to this larger argument about how classifications may track political relationships rather than a consistently applied standard. Chomsky presents the consequences of Washington’s interpretation as substantial for those affected, though this passage does not detail particular effects on the ANC.

Resistance and the Limits of the Record

The account links the controversy over the ANC’s designation to the broader question of whether resistance to colonial rule, racial domination, or foreign occupation can be treated differently from terrorism. The 1987 resolution’s language preserved a right to struggle against such conditions, while Chomsky maintains that the United States would not accept a global convention incorporating that provision. He argues that agreement would be possible only if the definition were reformulated to exempt powerful states and their clients from its reach.

The ANC is therefore presented not through a history of its organization, membership, or campaigns, but as a concise case in a debate about naming, state power, and political recognition. Chomsky’s point is that official classification can distinguish between movements and states even where the same general vocabulary of terrorism is ostensibly at issue.